





Modernization became so popular a term among the social scientists
that even historians took to using it. Often we employed it as a synonym
for history itself or for change, a kind of stylish accessory on a costume
in archive drab. But fashions change, and in some circles a reference to
modernization now evokes the distrust of a crew-cut; both are seen as
symbols of the tifties and sixties and of an optimistic American imperi-
alism. A more winning first paragraph these days is likely to promise
that what follows disproves, or at least rejects, modernization theory,
usually treated as a simple ideological cover for the skeletons of ethno-
centrism, capitalism, elitism, or an outmoded faith in rationality and
progress. For many, ideas of modernization are fatally intertwined with
the experience of cold war and of economic and military aid from the
United States. It may be, of course, that the horrors of Vietnam are no
more necessarily tied to modernization than Stalin’s purges to Marx-
ism ; but the mood of the moment is often not lenient.
THE MOOD OF REJECTION
In addition there are broader reasons for the common charge that
modernization is the political ideology of Western self-interest, de-
fensive and conservative. In some respects the drumbeats of moderni-
zation just a decade old now echo as strangely out of date. Although
the definitions of modernization vary considerably, they agree in an
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emphasis on man’s increasing control of his environment (Hagen, 1962:
7; Black, 1966; Organski, 1965: 7). For economists, the tempation is
simply to look at those relatively objective conditions that allow greater
productivity (Uphoff and Ilchman, 1972: 77-108). But many today-in
the prosperous countries, to be sure-distrust productivity; and for
those worried about nuclear war and pollution, talk of our control of
nature is ironic at best. Maybe modernization, the kinder critics sug-
gest, does not speak to current values, to a world concerned about
limited resources and the autonomous role of international corpora-
tions.
The mood of antipathy toward growth (or development), modernity
(or modernization), or theories about them contains a strong distrust
of cold rationality, whereas the theories distrusted have been put
forward by those who would make the social sciences the &dquo;sober trust-
ee&dquo; (the phrase is Almond and Powell’s, applied to political science
alone, however, 1966: 332) of the Enlightenment. And there are his-
torians, even more than other social scientists, eager to share the pat-
ricidal enthusiasm with which some contemporaries turn on their
rationalist heritage. The prejudice against approaches that have been
misused is hard to overcome. When some pedant notes that Leopold
von Ranke did not really advocate description without interpretation
or that August Comte did not claim that facts endlessly piled would
speak for themselves, the revision remains a footnote on a tombstone.
Modernization is so attractive a target that there is reason to suspect
it too will not survive. Troubled by the limits of our reason, the likeli-
hood our views are culture-bound, the fact that scholarship itself rests
comfortably in various establishments, we can forfend some criticism
by disassociating ourselves from talk of modernization. And there is no
more convenient way in which to make the conventional finding that
real societies are complex seem courageous than to present it as an
attack on modernization theory.
The students of modernization are in part themselves to blame for
this revulsion against their doctrines; they have too often claimed, or
at least implied, too much. Ideas and modes of analysis that seemed a
kind of breakthrough by the social sciences turned out on inspection
to be part of, and surprisingly close to, an old tradition. The new meth-
ods continued an old Western habit of seeing a dialectic between change
and tradition; the new model was like an old one: progress, with new
gadgets on it. If modernization was rooted in the Enlightenment, in old
views of progress (including the anthropology of Tyler, the history of de
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Tocqueville and Michelet, the sociology of Condorcet and the eco-
nomics of Adam Smith), and in the methods of Durkheim, Tbnnies,
and Weber (who is constantly quoted in the literature) then it seemed
likely to carry the prejudices and bad habits of old-fashioned optimism
and pretense to science. Modernization was itself an old Western (and
imperial) tradition (see Mazrui, 1968; Nisbet, 1969), out-of-date except
for its reflection of the era after World War II when the ties of empire
were transformed from political dominance to economic and military
aid. The concept, then, appeared doubly dated: old-fashioned and a
product of the 1950s as in this universal conclusion:
It appears that economic progress may well be an organic process similar to others
which take place in various forms of biological development. Once started, it will
grow and spread its seed in evergrowing circles over ever greater parts of the earth
wherever and whenever conditions are suitable [Brenner, 1969: 292].
We are back to those old questions of cultural and biological evolution
(Sahlins and Service, 1960: 5ff.). &dquo;Far from being a universally applica-
ble schema for the study of the development of human societies, the
nature of modernization theory reflects a particular phase in the de-
velopment of a single society, that of the United States&dquo; (Tipps, 1973:
211). Concepts antiseptically scientific that are discovered to carry the
bacteria of values; development &dquo;involves, for those who propose it
as for those to whom it is proposed, central value choices about the
meaning of life&dquo; (Goulet, 1973: 301). the disillusionment that usually
follows such confessions may be extraneous, the result more of the fact
that political theory is nearly moribund than of anything wrong with
ideas of modernization, but it adds to the mood of rejection.
None of these reservations needs to be viewed as devastating. If ideas
of modernization reflect a particular time and place, so do all others
including the current critiques; and in any case, the quality of a theory
need not depend on the circumstance that produced it. The intellectual
tradition from which modernization comes is not ignoble; technology,
science, and economic growth have brought impressive benefits no
matter what else is attributed to them. Even the disdain for ethnocen-
tricity, one might note with comforting irony, is characteristically
Western and not to be eradicated by proclamation. Nevertheless, the
merits of modernization-as process and theory-are now an open
question; and the meaning of the term, always a loose one (Eisenstadt,
1973: 109) has not been much clarified by debate or brave efforts to dis-
tinguish &dquo;modernization&dquo; from &dquo;development,&dquo; itself &dquo;one of the most
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deprecated terms in social science literature, having been used vastly
more than it has been understood&dquo; (Uphoff and Ilchman, 1972: ix).
Reinhard Bendix thought modernization as a term &dquo;useful despite its
vagueness because it tends to evoke similar associations in contempor-
ary readers&dquo; (Bendix, 1967: 292), but antimodernist sentiment has in
the decade since he wrote brought forth associations quite contrary to
those once dominant. Cyril Black (1966: 7-8) ascribed to modernization
the advantage of being &dquo;less encumbered with accretions of meaning&dquo;
than terms like progress or westernization, but the barnacles of suc-
cess-measured in hundreds of books and articles-have obscured that
trim and innocent line of thought.
The various theories of modernization have been subjected to so
much pointed and systematic criticism that there is no need to repeat
that here (Tipps, 1973; Holt and Turner, 1966: 12-50; Horowitz, 1966:
397-426; Tilly, 1975: 601-638). For the historian, however, applying
concepts of modernization presents some problems and temptations of
particular force.
THE DIFFICULTY OF APPLYING THE MODEL
The ideas and methods of structural functionalism have been central
to the concept of modernization (to such an extent that attacks on the
sociological method and on the concept have, falsely, often treated the
two as interchangeable so that any flaw in one reflects badly on the
other), and the writings of such scholars as David Apter, Neil Smelser,
Marion Levy, and Talcott Parsons (as well as scores of others who are
less rigorous and less formally structural functionalists) have carried
into the understanding of modernization one of Max Weber’s classic
formulations of dichotomous ideal types: traditional and modern
society. Now ideal types are not intended to fit any specific piece of
reality or describe any moment of history, and Shiner (1975) has ef-
fectively made the case that tradition and modernity are not the ex-
tremes of a single scale. Bendix (1967: 295, 313-320) considers the
contrast &dquo;invidious.&dquo; Within the pair, tradition is the insidious, mis-
leading term. Modernization, it is often pointed out, is not the same
as modernity (Bendix, 1967: 329), and we enjoy some at least rough
agreement as to what the term, a description of process, means. But
traditional society as an ideal type is so clear as to be impossible. It
can mislead historians into sentences about &dquo;this structured, change-
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less, compact, traditional order&dquo; (Shorter, 1975: 21) and is probably
more dangerous when less provocative. In an effort to make the term
more useful it has been re-defined even to the point of including creativi-
ty as one of its qualities, and constricted by modifiers until there are
various traditions, as Eisenstadt notes, adding that the term has never
been carefully refined. Indeed, he and others agree that traditional
behavior played its part in the industrialization of many societies
and can still be found in all modern ones (Eisenstadt, 1973: 13, 99-103,
119-120; Braibanti and Spengler, 1961; Hoselitz and Moore, 1963: 83-
114). Nor does Shils’ distinction between tradition and traditionalism
help much; for, as he points out, all traditional beliefs are forever being
modified and new traditions evolve from older ones (Shils, 1960: 144-
145, 154). Logic adds that &dquo;non-innovational&dquo; responses can be &dquo;pro-
gressive&dquo; just as traditional behavior is a part of bureaucratic (modern)
societies (Sklair, 1970: 137-139), and historians could happily add
dozens of cases in which putting-out systems were more efficient than
factories, patron-client networks proved better mobilizers than parties,
and local elites were more rational than central governments. Max
Weber would never have assumed that historic survivals can be con-
sidered doomed anachronisms, and modern historians should not
either. Perhaps Karl Deutsch’s wry comment is correct that ideal types
may produce good results &dquo;in the hands of empirical masters&dquo; but that
this is &dquo;due less to the excellence of the method used than to the compe-
tence of the men who use it&dquo; (Deutsch, 1966: 49). In any case, those con-
cerned with history might do better to reduce the concept of traditional
society to a modest operational level: a convenient shorthand for dis-
missing the past prior to the particular change one intends to study.
Elimination of the category, traditional society, would, however,
more clearly expose a second difficulty in the application of ideas of
modernization, one that strikes close to historians’ concern for chrono-
logy. Modernization has no beginning and no natural periodization.
This awkward quality is most apparent as models of modernization
designed for non-Western societies are applied to European history,
but in principle it holds everywhere. Even on a scale less grand than
that of Hegel, Buckle, Comte, Marx, Spengler, or Toynbee there is an
unprescribed choice as to whether the proper units are civilizations,
societies, states, or eras. A more modest periodization must depend on
whether the central historical problem is thought to lie in certain in-
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stitutions (the church, the army, the bureaucracy, the national bank, or
public school-each has its appropriate chronological frame), groups
(elite or mass), markets, or ideas. The problem is hardly new, and
historians have managed to write important books without solving it.
When the proposition (about modernization) being tested controls the
social sample to be examined, the circularity becomes graver. The more
common choice, of course, is in the case of Europe to start with indus-
trialization and the French Revolution (although that is awkward with
regard to state-building, see Tilly, 1975), and, outside Europe, begin
with imperialism. Thoroughly defensible, such a traditional periodiza-
tion invites and maybe even necessitates reliance on traditional em-
phases, allowing older views of political and economic history to remain
dominant (it also tends to treat revolution, industrialization, or coloni-
zation as a sudden external stimulus, whereas historians of those
phenomena usually find them part of a continuing process). In such a
context, modernization is likely to become a convenient summary of
standard lore rather than the use of new concepts and better measures of
modernization with which to build new structures of analysis. This is
merely disappointing. The problem becomes serious on the time scale
within which most new historical research is conducted. The course of
modernization which provides such bright guiding beacons as one sails
from feudal to modern, from a hypothetical past to a predicted future,
casts very dim light on what development to expect within a decade.
This is not so true where the prediction is one of straightforward ag-
gregate growth; and historical work has benefitted significantly from
concepts of modernization (although by no means always sustaining
them) applied even to short-term studies of schooling, political par-
ticipation, vaccination, the use of technology, and so forth. Signifi-
cantly, concepts of modernization applied to detailed study of more
complex processes have been less notable. Indeed, the flow in this case
is often in the opposite direction: observed changes in administrative
structure, urbanization, economic relations, or politicization-like
the differences in society before and after revolution-are allowed to
define the immediate meaning of modernization. There is, of course,
no law to say how much of the changes ascribed to a whole society over
a century or two should be reflected in a single institution or group or
region in the course of a few years. But most historical research will
[295]
not be much improved by ideas of modernization, and concepts of
modernization will not be much affected by what historians do until the
reasons for expecting any connection between long-term development
and short-term change are clearly stated and the measures of such
changes formally established.
This is even harder than it sounds. Everyone agrees that not all of
society changes together (Smelser, 1976: 161-162) and that change does
not occur at a regular rate. But if the critical changes can be recognized,
their presence or absence in a limited space and time can at least be
fruitfully related to the larger process. Unfortunately, the sorts of social
change the concept of modernization has best described-increased
capacity, control over nature, rationality, equality, differentiation, and
secularization (logically, a subset of differentiation that is, however,
often treated separately)-do not provide clear guides to research. Is
every new title or office, regulation or expansion of bureaucracy to be
considered differentiation? How do we understand capacity, except in
the limited terms of what happened? Even if such terms can be given
very precise behavioral definitions, it is not certain we could establish
measures that would allow comparisons of degree or rate of change,
while preserving something of the richness and breadth of the initial
concept.
Finally, historians will do well to jettison that aspect of moderniza-
tion called convergence theory, the assumption that modernizing so-
cieties became more alike. A tempting extension of the model, it is not
the logical next step it seems to be, with its implications of total social
transformations and technological determinism (see the searing cri-
tiques of Weinberg, 1969, and Skinner, 1976). For the historian, its
danger is in the tendency to make change a juggernaut, to discourage
that discrimination that is the historian’s forte which allows for differ-
ent degrees and forms of change and change itself as mere adaptation.
The instinctive suspicion of simplification, which is not methodologic-
ally heroic nor even always sound, remains in this case a safer bet, more
likely to open important questions and to lead to fresh comparisons.
When we find ourselves talking of postmodern societies, we can suspect
we have stripped the concept of modernization of much of its suggestive
sense of process and variety.
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THE BURDEN OF BIAS
Less accustomed to claiming methodological objectivity, historians
may be less shocked than other social scientists at the suggestion that
some bias shows through. Critics have had no trouble in showing that
some of the literature on modernization is loaded with assumptions and
preferences that stem from the author’s place, time, and values. The
important question, however, lies elsewhere. Are certain consistent
biases so basic to the model that they cannot be escaped, that to use it
at all is to risk falling into hidden traps? The most frequent charges
are that theories of modernization are ethnocentrically Western; teleo-
logical (if not downright deterministic); conservative in their preference
for stability over conflict, their attention to institutions, and their poli-
cy-oriented admiration of skilled crisis management; and that they
nevertheless exaggerate change over continuity. Since one of the at-
tributes of modernization models, also much lamented, is their loose-
ness, scholars willing to live with that (but are they then social scien-
tists ?) should also enjoy the freedom to avoid these biases (while recog-
nizing that the concept of modernization provides little protection
against those prejudices the scholar happens to share).
This temptation to judge the world in terms of Western development is
probably no more intrinsic to models of modernization than to Western
culture itself, and many social scientists have effectively struggled
against it (see Gellner, 1965 on the dangers of the confusion of Western
and non-Western societies). Three precautions can go far to lessen the
danger. If the early literature on modernization was especially laden
with ethnocentricism, that was often due less to parochial misunder-
standing of non-Western society than to a falsely simple, uniform, and
foreshortened view of Western history. As the study of modernization
has turned more to Western examples, strong corrections are avail-
able and should be heeded. Historians should find that familiar. Sec-
ond, one must escape that limited imagination which assumes that the
modes of efficiency, rationality,of differentiation in one culture cannot
be fundamentally different in another. Anthropologists have estab-
lished techniques, with some marked successes, for limiting such cul-
ture-bound assumptions. After Levi-Strauss everyone should be wary
of labelling alien cultures as simple just because their economy is poor
or their society based on ties of kinship. The third precaution is to pay
close attention to the form in which the challenge to modernize is pre-
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sented, whether it comes in terms of competition or conquest, ideas or
force or markets, suddenly or slowly. These differences of context will,
in combination with the nature of the society being modernized, shape
the course of its development-a consideration well known to political
science and economics. With such precautions, no scholar need be
afraid to acknowledge that Europe industrialized first or exported its
institutions and values through example, conversion, and raw aggres-
sion unparalleled in modern history. Nor need one throw out the model
to concede that within Europe and elsewhere both regions more modern
and those less developed were affected by the process.
Adherence to such warnings will restrict some of the intellectual
ventures made in the interests of studying modernization. One of the
strengths of the entire approach has been its attention to cultural and
psychological change. Understandably, Daniel Lerner’s book has been
one of the most influential of the last generation (Lerner, 1958). Yet the
psychological types adduced as modern can quickly erode into asser-
tions of the necessity for Western values. With care that pitfall can be
avoided; the psychology of modernizers is no more uniform than their
economies. Convenient lists of some other society’s impediments to
development, on the other hand, will probably always be open to
charges of &dquo;intellectual neo-colonialism&dquo; (Uphoff and Ilchman, 1972:
17-19).
Enough social scientists have written of modernization as an open-
ended process to establish that, conceptually at least, teleology is not
inherent, although hints of it appear likely to creep back whenever
one’s philosophic guard is relaxed. The danger for any researcher who
knows the shape of destiny is the tendency to close off good questions
before they are posed. The solution is in a good research design (which
could choose explicitly teleologic positions), and it is worth adding
that to apply a particular model does not mean that it must be proven
correct. The urge to give history a goal is not the original sin of moderni-
zation. Similarly, conservatism may be embedded in the history of the
concept of the heart of an author, but liberals of every stripe and social-
ists, too, have made effective use of the idea. To confuse attention to
the role of institutions with conservative bias is itself a prejudice. On
the other hand, there is a more serious charge-aimed especially at
structural functionalism-that the concept of modernization mistakes
stability for a sign of health and normality, viewing conflict as transi-
tional distress. Its thrust is methodological, and it points to the tendency
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to let abstract discriptions of social systems (in equilibrium) became
narrowing and normative. Talcott Parsons, Smelser, and others have
insisted that mode of analysis can and does allow for change, although
the point is still somewhat in dispute. The potential of an analytic tool
is hard to distinguish from the way it is most commonly used. Structural
functionalists certainly do not think conflict abnormal, but they need
rare skill to keep from treating it as extrinsic to the social system. A far
graver danger, however, lies in the urge to make of modernization a
basis for wise advice. To analyze the means of system maintenance may
be neutral, though one worries; to prescribe the strategies that will
keep an elite in power, a party strong, or a system operative is not. It
is simply not true that because scientific theories predict (in very con-
trolled circumstances), social scientific theories should be tested in the
king’s council (see Tilly, 1975: 621). Unaccustomed to being consulted
by those in power, historians ought to be able to resist the temptation.
The tendency to exaggerate change, on the contrary, is one of histori-
ans’ favorite vices, applied most liberally to the period under study.
Since concepts of modernization often incorporate a kind of law of
inertia whereby change once launched is more likely to continue or even
accelerate, there is a tendency to confuse the fact of flux with a vector
of change, the fact of change with a consciousness of it, consciousness
with social habit. Marxists know the problem. In fact, as Barrington
Moore points out (Moore, 1966: 485-487), continuity is as problematic
as change and deserves comparable historical attention. That the past
survives in the present may be the only sense in which any change is
irreversible. Here too the solution lies in method; the best models of
modernization will allow for distinctions as to the source, nature, dura-
bility, direction, and extent of change, will view social systems in their
parts as well as wholes (thereby not confusing political endurance with
social stability), and will consequently be ill-suited to serve as states-
men’s handbooks. As wise statesmen suspect, there are not yet good
measures for many of the changes that matter most.
THE UNIT OF ANALYSIS
Hegel had no doubt that the state was among the great achievements
of historical development, and, therefore, a fundamental unit for its
analysis, and most of the writing on modernization across two centuries
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of Western nationalism has seemed to share his confidence. Yet the
students of state-building, historians, sociologists, or political scien-
tists, have always known that the modern national state is not the
natural unit nineteenth-century romanticism portrayed (see Tilly, 1975;
Eisenstadt and Rokkan, 1973); and conversation with a Basque patriot,
a glance at the political maps of Africa, or a moment’s reflection on the
history of Burgundy would sustain the point. Having learned again to
distrust the state, we are more inclined to count its costs in repression,
resources extracted, and warfare. That and our interest in social and
economic history, in popular culture and behavioral analyses of pol-
itics makes it easier to perceive that the state is not the unit in which
social change or modernization occurs. Neither is it the unit in which
technology spreads, not within which capitalism develops, or on which
it builds.
A strong case can be made, then, for the region as the unit of analysis
for modernization (Schneider et al. 1972: 330). Here the interrelation-
ship of economy and culture, elite and institutions, tends to be tighter
and levels of development more homogenous. Through this smaller but
sharper focus the relationship between external stimuli and factors
intrinsic to local development can be more clearly assessed. The con-
nections between modernization and a powerful state can be analyzed
in terms of relations between center and periphery, bringing into play
an impressive battery of political-science literature (see Tarrow, 1977:
esp. 17ff for an assessment of three such models). Once one of the clear-
est implications in theories of modernization was that in the modern
state linguistic conflict would be eliminated; now it appears that such
conflict may be a result of modernization having strengthened regional
resistance to the national center. Much of the future of modernization
studies is likely to lie in work at this level; yet it must be quickly ack-
nowledged that regions are harder to define than states, and that eco-
nomic, cultural, political, and geographic regions are rarely neatly
coterminous.
An alternative now proving immensely stimulating is to leap from
analysis of regions to what Wallerstein calls the modern world-system
(Wallerstein, 1974a, 1974b). So broad a canvas fits modernization well.
The world, says Eisenstadt, is the &dquo;cardinal category&dquo; of social science;
when the world is the system, all nations are developing-also back-
ward (Eisenstadt, 1973: 107). Like the neo-Marxist analysis on which it
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builds (see Frank, 1969, 1975; and the essays, especially Frank’s and
Barani’s in Rhodes, 1970), Wallerstein’s studies portray the creation of
a world-wide division of labor through the expansion of European
capitalism. The partial and stifled modernization of third world coun-
tries, which has disappointed analysts for whom modernization was a
principle to live by as well as a topic, is readily explained. Andre Frank’s
preferred subject becomes the development of underdevelopment. As a
universal process, modernization has turned itself off. It is not yet clear
how much autonomy such theories of dependence can grant to politics
or culture or whether parallel theories will be developed for these other
spheres. A heavy emphasis on the dominance of capitalist markets
could of course leave local society visible only as a victim, an affect that
like ethnocentrism would ignore the creative adaptability of local cul-
tures. The world frame should, Wallerstein argues ( 1974b), aid com-
parative study; but he, too, calls for better local studies; and his center,
periphery, and semiperiphery are no crisper units for empirical study
than state or region. At the very least, international factors (economic
and political if not intellectual and religious) will have to be better
woven into subsequent models of modernization.
Perhaps geographical space is not the proper unit at all. In fact, it is
usually the system (social, political, or economic) within that space that
is the real object of analysis; nation, region, or world give it familiarity
and attractive concreteness. With the social system as the unit of analy-
sis, concepts of modernization share the yeasty theory-making potential
of structural functionalism. The problems that follow are familiar. In
the real world the boundaries of systems are fuzzy, artificial, or both.
Analysis in terms of social systems leads to distinctions between exo-
genous and endogenous factors and that may well underlie an often
noted weakness of developmental theories, their inadequate treatment
of international factors affecting the process of modernization. A mili-
tary threat, new technology, a political or religious movement may
initially be exogenous, but domestic responses will normally combine
exogenous and endogemous elements, and that in turn may alter the
exogenous factors (or at least their impact). The system in short is being
continually redefined. The problems of diffusion versus autonomous
development that fascinated generations of anthropologists are still
alive in discussions of modernization, and some of the most imaginative
work in the field has used theories of communication. Here as well as in
more conventional political-science approaches, emphasis is placed on
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the role of elites. There are many sound reasons for doing so (Smith,
1971: 86-150), in the course of which, however, it becomes frighteningly
easy to associate the rich and varied process of modernization with the
values and ambitions of the middle class (Qadeer, 1974: 283). That may
be one of the reasons the literature on modernization has made little
contribution to our understanding of the place of social class in social
change, increasing the likelihood of Western bias, distrust of conflict,
and indifference to local variations. Perhaps, then, social classes and
institutions should in themselves be the units of analysis. After all, most
of the talk about states has really been directed to leaders and armies
and administrations. Alas, that leads to a third difficulty which stems
from the subtlety and power of structural-functional analysis: the
systematic functions of that analysis are not each performed by a dif-
ferent institution or group. Rather, the units of analysis to which em-
pirical social scientists are accustomed-bureaucracies and classes, for
example-may each contribute to many or all of the various systemic
functions. There is no neat checklist of which groups and institutions to
investigate or in which systemic categories to place them. When one
adds attention to the importance of social values and systems of belief-
and it is one of the great strengths of most writing on modernization
that these matters have not been left in the background as mere cultural
climate to be selectively cited when useful, but have been given central
place-then the problem is compounded. One can understand the sober
conclusion that the difficulties of determining the proper unit of analy-
sis are simply not surmountable (Tilly, 1975: 619-620).
No wonder Tipps has told us to abandon modernization (Tipps,
1973: 223). The concept is vague as well as unattractive, even offensive
to many. Its various models are difficult to apply; it may after all have
some serious built-in biases, and it does not define its units of analysis
with the clarity the social sciences seek. But a kind of common sense
makes one hesitate to throw the concept out.
In the last two centuries, something similar has happened to most
of the world-in technology obviously, through economics clearly, but
also in politics and social organization. Perhaps no evidence makes the
point so clearly as the demographic revolutions that have swept the
world, slightly different in each case, rarely simultaneous, but with
common patterns that are inescapable (Vinovskis, 1976: 81-85). These
large-scale changes that put people in schools and change their diets,
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redefine work, amass new wealth and power, and alter the organiza-
tions through which all this is structured while maintaining surprising
continuity-this whole complex process deserves a name and moderni-
zation springs to mind.
The effort to understand that process has stimulated one of the most
magnificent intellectual outpourings of which we know for well over a
century, grand theories and specific research on at first a Western and
now a worldwide scale. With all its pretensions and repetitions, its
looseness and confusion, this great literature is close to the heart of
the social sciences. A significant part of it claims to be about modern-
ization, and any attempt to amputate it is likely to harm some of the
vital organs to which it is attached. ,
MODERNIZATION AND HISTORY
&dquo;Every system is prisoner of its past&dquo; (Almond and Powell, 1966:
301). The concerns of modernization include those resonant themes
that have stimulated the most admired historical writings: broad social
transformations, the clash of cultures, and the tension between deter-
minism and choice. In addition, the belief that some other society is
better organized, more powerful or richer and that it has become so not
by accident but as a result of superior learning, freedom, justice, loyalty,
or organization has been held by most leaders since the early nineteenth
century. Belief in modernization is a central fact of modern history and
one in which liberalism, nationalism, and Marxism have concurred. (on
the contemporary importance of that belief, see Nettl and Robertson,
1968). The burden of proof, adds Talcott Parsons (1971: 137), is on
those who think that there is any society that will not adopt some variety
of modernization.
Ironically, a concept developed from the Western perspective on
&dquo;backward&dquo; countries has proved especially useful when applied to
development in the richly documented West, exposing it as complex,
uneven, and incomplete, the national state well-established, and com-
munication comparatively easy. The close look that concepts of mod-
ernization require of the relationship between values and social change
had the added advantage when seen in our own culture of making clear
that those who have at one time or another resisted modernizing change
cannot simply be dismissed as provincial (or peripheral), illiterate, or
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peasant captives of tradition. As a laboratory for investigating deter-
minisms, study of modernization has made us grant a larger part to
climate and bacteria, restrict the claims for technology and mode of
production, and eliminate those of race and perhaps religion.
Long regarded, by others, as the retarded member in the family of the
social sciences, the discipline of history has been stimulated and
changed by the insights of social psychology, the concepts of anthro-
pology, the theories of economics, the models of sociology, and the be-
havioral methods of political science. The findings and methods of the
other social sciences have met history, challenged it and learned from
it, primarily through related attempts to analyze modernization. His-
torians who still take pride in crisp (or orotund) prose are inclined to
smile on learning of their neighbors’ new interest in time-series, dia-
chronic analysis, or longitudinal studies; but the future of the discipline
is made brighter by the widespread recognition of the need to study
social behavior in context and across time. The interest in moderniza-
tion is fundamentally an historical one, and historians have a stake in it.
As they turn to the longue durée, adopt the techniques of demography,
use quantitative methods, apply formal models, and test explicit hypo-
theses, they have more and more to contribute. One is tempted to add
that a discipline able to find analytic potential in concepts so loose as
Renaissance, the rising middle class, or feudalism ought to be able to do
a good deal more with modernization.
A well-known report on history and the social sciences sees three
major concerns of social-scientific history: collective behavior, theo-
retical concepts and models, and extensive comparison (Landes and
Tilly, 1971: 71-73). In turning to modernization historians should make
contributions through all three approaches. Despite well-founded cri-
ticism, even those skeptical of mechanical applications of the concept
still expect to find it useful for a wide range of questions from new work
on the family (Hareven, 1976: 203-204) to discriminating among forms
of fascism (Turner, 1975: 131-133).
MODERNIZATION AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
&dquo;Man is not a captive of history &dquo; (Black, 1966: 157). From the stand-
point of the other social sciences much the same can be said. Few sub-
jects have brought these disciplines to such borrowings and coopera-
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tion. A close sampling of the enormous literature on the subject will
incidentally show that many of the errors attributed to modernization
theory were effectively avoided by the ablest scholars all along. More
important, it will show an extraordinary awareness of each other’s
work. The debates within each discipline-on evolution, capital, dif-
fusion, community, center and periphery, class conflict, institutions,
markets, religion, and elites-have in the context of modernization
flowed across disciplines. This gives much of the writing on moderniza-
tion something of the dull refinement of a faculty club as scholars end-
lessly cite each other; but it also offers hope of that cumulative qual-
ity that is a mark of science, a quality which requires that we &dquo;link our ef-
forts to the mainstream of social and historical thought&dquo; (Goody, 1976:
41). Works on politics now pay more attention to the general culture,
works on economics to politics, on culture to both, and all of them
to history. The effect has been to integrate social change in the analysis
of society, to recognize that alternation of one part affects the others
(see, e.g., Weinstein and Platt, 1966). On the whole, the books have
improved.
One of the strengths of that literature has been its effort to avoid
simple ethnocentricism and evolutionism, to expand our awareness of
social variety to include non-Western experience on an equal plane, as
Auguste Comte and John Stuart Mill once wanted to do and most stu-
dents of society in the late nineteenth, and early twentieth century
considered false relativism (Burrow, 1966; Goody, 1976: 1-2; Almond
and Powell, 1966: 1-8). Another strength has been the consistent effort
to see society whole, interrelated in its complex parts though disas-
sembled for analysis. Too often such goals stand firmer in the introduc-
tions than in the analyses-because the task is hard, methods less cer-
tain than they sound are easily abused even by the most careful scholar,
and visions of definitive findings often urge galloping prospectors to
push past complexity. More than any single intellectual movement,
interest in modernization among the social sciences has revivified that
systematic comparison essential to all science (Easton, 1965: 483-484).
Suspect evolutionism has been so closely associated with the aspira-
tion for a science of society that it may be wiser to tame it through a
sophisticated view of modernization (which even in its simplest forms
rarely comes close to proposing unilinear evolution and which in prin-
ciple at least allows for &dquo;negative or regressive&dquo; development) [Almond
and Powell, 1966: 34-35] than to abandon the latter because of the naive
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positivism common to the former. So long as we conduct our research
as if the process of change has some direction and those changes affect
all the world, we are operating in the seas of modernization. In doing so,
we might as well start with the charts we have, especially since we now
have some measures of their magnetic deviation.
Obviously, these common enterprises will go forward whether or not
modernization continues to serve as the esperanto of the social sciences.
The point lies there: the problems will remain even if the name is re-
moved. Broadsides at the concept will add to the confusion more than
aid the battle to understand modern change. So far the effort has suf-
fered no greater flaw than the tendency of those with fine conceptual
schemes to fill them with borrowed and bad history. Significantly, a
high proportion of the best work on modernization has been done by
Europeans in America whose personal culture included rich knowledge
of history combined with training in the social sciences and employed
independent of traditional disciplinary lines. That lesson may be more
important than the dangers of the &dquo;vague and generalized images&dquo;
modernization evokes, at least so long as its severest critics can find no
better alternative (Tipps, 1973: 202, 224).
The metaphors and syndromes of modernization became the sort of
intellectual fad to which the social sciences, in their eagerness to prove
themselves a science, are particularly subject. While some worried
about clean definitions, usable models, and testable hypotheses, the
subject was swamped as everyone attached his study to the term (with
historians generally arriving last and loosest). Thus modernization
theory without further specification is meaningless. We laugh at Don
Quixote for tilting at windmills because he mistook them for something
else, something more vital and less prosaic. In the case of those who
break a lance against modernization theory (or even more tendentiously
modernization theory of the family, of workers, or urbanization, of
democracy, or of progress) the windmill is not even there. There is no
modernization theory as such only particular theories, and certainly no
theory of how specific institutions or movements must change, only the




AND (WHAT IS LEFT OF) MODERNIZATION
Modernization refers to the opportunities and challenges of greater
wealth and power that have become common to the modern world.
These opportunities and challenges may arrive through diffusion (of
ideas, institutions, or techniques), through formal exchange, or by
force. The primary subject of study for students of modernization is the
various adaptations to these common challenges and opportunities,
adaptations that may include modification of established customs and
institutions or the importation or invention of new ones, adaptations
that may be primarily endogenous or externally determined, partial or
extensive, both conscious and involuntary. These in turn may unleash a
seemingly continuous process of change, build new resistance to further
adaptation, or simply stop short. But the &dquo;form of adaptation is of
greater concern to the study of modernization than the fate of civiliza-
tions&dquo; (Black, 1966:61).
The goal in studying these adaptations is systematic comparison to
establish (1) the differences that follow from the various ways and tim-
ing by which these different challenges and opportunities make them-
selves felt, (2) the patterns of adaptation within various sectors of soc-
iety and the interconnection between them as adaptive change takes
place, and (3) the relationship to society at large of the social forms that
emerge.
The broader periodizations of modernization stem from these com-
mon opportunities and challenges. More immediate periodizations
follow from the particular cases of adaptation. Between the two, one
can study with Braudel (1969: 43) the infinitely repeated &dquo;dialectic of
the durée&dquo; between the specific instant and the slow unfolding of time.
Conjuncture is not so different from development.
The units of analysis will be specific kinds of challenges and oppor-
tunities (whose commonality provides the sense, now decently faint, of
historical direction); the groups, institutions, or regions that adapt; the
common and specific forms of adaptation (a basis for building theory).
Structural-functional approaches have been so important because they
provide a conceptual way of relating these units to each other. It does
not follow, although the leap in logic is easy to make, that similar
social accomplishments require similar societies. But nota bene, this
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analysis is still not in itself a theory. It does not predict the form or
effect of change nor even its general cause; there is no assumption that
these units of analysis evolve by internal laws.
Each of the social sciences has contributions to make at each level of
analysis; but the most fruitful, especially for historians, is likely to be
the middle level-the groups, institutions, or regions that adapt. In the
analysis of these specific cases, models and methods can be borrowed
from different disciplines with less risk of &dquo;interdisciplinary hangovers&dquo;
and avoiding the early mistake of devoting &dquo;too much attention to total
systems&dquo; (LaPalombara, 1969: 1254, 1259). The evolution observed will
be &dquo;specific evolution&dquo; rather than &dquo;general,&dquo; and there will be no diffi-
culty in acknowledging that &dquo;adaptive improvement is relative to the
adaptive problem&dquo; (Sahlins and Service, 1960: 15, 26, 43-4.4). Nor is this
adaptation to be confused with progress, for it includes responses like
Hagen’s (1962: 197, 216, 415-416, 500-501) retreatism. Attention to
adaptation at this middle level may indeed be similar to the shift Nisbet
(1969: 230-231 ) has noted in Durkheim and Marx from interest in the
panoramic to internal processes.
Once a critical group (of kinship, class, or occupation, for example)
or institution (of trade, bureaucracy, or religion) or region (however de-
fined) has been identified and isolated, systematic comparison still re-
quires great care. A common error has been to assume that analogous
social organizations have comparable social roles in different societies
or at different times in the same society, and to assume a priori that the
opportunities or threats they face are similar. This is why comparisons
of armies have worked better than comparisons of parliaments, com-
parisons of parliaments better than of priests, of priests better than of
the family. The more comparable their social functions, the more fruit-
ful the comparison, and the test of effectiveness is less how useful the
comparison is to some grand system than whether it increases under-
standing of the cases compared. The usual weakness in comparing
Western feudalism with land tenure in Japan before the Tokugawa lies
not in the comparison itself but in cutting it short to leap to a label
for common stages. Knowledge is more surely increased when the com-
parison is of reality rather than abstractions, of particular cases to each
other rather than to ideal types. In the literature on modernization there
is ample illustration of the merits of this middle level and of careful
comparison.
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Current work on social indicators and the growing data banks of
historical statistics should also be prominent in future work on modern-
ization. Skillful use of aggregate data-on population, migration,
urbanization, education, public services, housing, wages, arrests and
convictions-can provide the sort of overall measures of change that
economists and students of voting behavior have long exploited. As
always, specific problems will call for particular methods; quantifica-
tion, model-building, and archival research will, if our central questions
are good and our hypotheses carefully posed, all make their contri-
butions (Wallerstein, 1974b: 415). Modernization as a subject of study
can continue to help identify vital questions; it provides no methods of
its own. The ecological models of anthropologists as well as their
conception of culture; the behavioral research of political scientists
(and their example in eschewing formalism); newer fields like socio-
linguistics with much to say about the nature of cultural contact and
adaptation; econometrics and political economy; demography-all are
enticingly relevant. Perhaps even the visions of team research and of
common research designs to be employed across disciplines and in
various parts of the world can be revived, despite the passing of the
exuberance of the 1950s and 1960s. Healthy doubts about what mod-
ernization does to society (and what social scientists claim they are
about to discover) could in their way be as useful a spur to exciting re-
search as the open purses and luxurious conferences that once, in a
double sense, seemed an intrinsic part of modernization.
If there is an historical lesson, it is not to expect too much. Moderni-
zation is essentially about social processes; it speaks but faintly to the
outcome of entire cultures. Its most important findings in the future are
iikely to be about differences-in forms of adaptation, in opportunities
presented, and threats endured in each era and area. Although that will
make overarching theory more difficult, it does not reduce the chance
for higher levels of generalization or make the continued study of
modernization less worthwhile. Twenty-five years ago Marion Levy
(1952: viii) foresaw that no definitive treatment of the task he had set
himself would ever be completed but found the attempt worthwhile.
The road to modernity, Edward Shils (1960: 411) warned an optimistic
age, would be neither straight nor easy; and those who arrived would
find their destination very different from what their ancestors had
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